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The idea that intentionality is the distinctive mark of the mental or that only 
mental phenomena have intentionality emerged in the philosophical 
tradition after Franz Brentano. Much of contemporary philosophy is 
dedicated to a rejection of the view that mental phenomena have original 
intentionality. In other words, main strands of contemporary philosophy 
seek to naturalize intentionality of the mental by tracing it to linguistic 
intentionality. So in order to avoid the problematic claim that a physical 
phenomenon can in virtue of its own physical structure mean exactly one 
thing, they adopt a form of holism. Nevertheless, contemporary 
philosophers are attracted to a naturalist story about the emergence of the 
logical space. In this work, I am interested in the naturalism and the holism 
advocated by Wilfrid Sellars and developed by the Pittsburgh school. It is 
not only a view that I find theoretically attractive but I also admire it for its 
fecund engagement with the history of philosophy, especially the work of 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and, as I will argue, Abū Nas̩r Muḥammad 
al-Fārābī (Alfarabi). 
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Introduction 
Franz Brentano, in his influential Psychology from An Empirical 
Standpoint, claims that every mental phenomenon is characterized by 
intentionality—that is, by the inclusion of an object within itself 
(Brentano 1995, 88). From this formulation, the subsequent tradition of 
philosophy has extracted three main characteristics of intentionality:2  
(1) A mental phenomenon is about or directed toward an object. (2) 
Objects of mental phenomena are characterized by intentional 
inexistence. (3) Intentionality is the distinctive mark of the mental.  
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2. I have isolated these with the help of three sources: Jacob (2008), Black (2010), and 
Haugeland (1990). 
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In this short essay, I begin by considering the third characteristic more 
carefully. There is a naturalistic tendency in contemporary philosophy to 
reject the traditional interpretation of this characteristic—that is, the view 
that mental phenomena have intentionality intrinsically and other 
phenomena (e.g., a sentence) have it derivatively. In other words, some 
strands of contemporary philosophy seek to naturalize intentionality of 
the mental by deriving it from linguistic intentionality. But in order to 
avoid the problematic claim that a physical phenomenon can, in virtue of 
its own physical structure, mean exactly one thing, they adopt a form of 
holism; to put it less controversially, they claim that the intentionality of 
an individual verbal state or occurrence depends on the naturally 
emergent pattern into which it fits, and this pattern is that of the logical 
space (and distinguished from that of the space of natural sciences) 
(Haugeland 1990, 386). In this work, I am interested in the naturalism 
and the holism advocated by Wilfrid Sellars and developed by the 
Pittsburgh school.1  More specifically, I would like to consider the 
continuity of this position with the work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel and, as I will argue, Abū Nas̩r Muḥammad al-Fārābī (Alfarabi). 
For Sellars and the Pittsburgh school, intentionality is a result of 
acquiring an autonomous standing in the logical space of reasons, which 
is in turn made possible by initiation into a language. I submit that both 
Hegel and Alfarabi claim that a certain political order, anchored in 
religion, is presupposed for the emergence of, and our proper situation 
in, the logical space. Hegel’s historical account identifies the required 
order with the political appropriation of Christianity by the later Roman 
Empire. Alfarabi, on the other hand, draws on Islamic theories of 
prophecy to advocate an ideal state governed by a philosopher-prophet-
ruler. I will conclude that whereas Hegel’s view remains constrained by 
the development of thought within the borders of Europe, Alfarabi’s 
position is more inclusive. 
Intentionality and the Logical Space of Reasons 
In “Being and Being Known,” Sellars celebrates a form of 
abstractionism he finds in Thomas as a precursor to his own view that 
the intentionality of mental states is inherited from those of overt 
linguistic utterances (Sellars 1963, 49-50; 57-58); nevertheless, Sellars 
suggests that Thomas remains committed to a problematic account of 
the relation between the intellectual order and the real order.2 Sellars 
                                                     
1. Haugeland (1990) discusses several possible approaches to intentionality in 
contemporary philosophy and distinguishes Sellars’s neo-pragmatism from neo-
Cartesianism of Fodor, Field and Pylyshin, and the neo-behaviorism of Quine, 
Dennett and Stalnaker. 
2. On the merits of Sellars’s criticisms of Aquinas, see King (2010, 25-44). Also I am 
not suggesting that the treatment of the relation between Avicenna’s account of 
intentionality and that of Thomas Aquinas is not interesting itself; it is just beyond 
the narrow scope of this short paper. 
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then argues that to extirpate himself from this problematic view, 
Thomism needs to abandon the idea that sensations have intentionality 
(1963, 45-46). To be sure, Sellars embraces an isomorphism between 
sensations and the external world, but that isomorphism, Sellars thinks, 
is non-intentional (1963, 56-57). Therefore, for Sellars, intentionality is 
non-relational and is determined by the normativity of the space of 
significances (i.e., the space of reasons) (1963, 58). 
Sellars’s central thesis, which he calls “psychological nominalism” 
elsewhere,1 is that the intentionality of mental states (i.e., the aboutness 
of thoughts) is derived from the meaningfulness of overt linguistic 
utterances. In other words, Sellars offers a naturalist account of the 
emergence of the intentionality of mental states from the proprieties that 
are a feature of overt linguistic utterances. John Haugeland refines this 
account by showing that it presupposes a natural conformism, which is 
“not mere imitativeness (monkey see, monkey do), but also 
censoriousness—that is, a tendency to see that one’s neighbors do 
likewise, and to suppresses variation” (Haugeland 1990, 404). Such 
“wired in” conformism produces patterns of cultural propriety 
(normativity) which legitimate the proper use of linguistic expressions. 
The intentionality of mental states is, in turn, inherited from the 
normativity of overt linguistic utterances.  
Despite their insistence that norms emerge from a natural/linguistic 
basis, Sellars and Sellarsians advocate an absolute autonomy for the 
normative order. Haugeland, for instance, maintains that the norms 
which regulate moves in the space of reasons are not causal regularities 
nor social conventions. In regard to the latter, he says: “The difference 
between norms and conventions lies in this explanatory appeal: 
conformism (to norms) does not presuppose any prior beliefs or 
preferences on the part of individual conformists, and hence the 
persistence of norms cannot be explained in terms of agents’ interest 
maximization or rational choice” (Haugeland 1990, 407). John 
McDowell, another Sellarsian, also echoes this account of norms when 
he calls the space of reasons sui generis and identifies it as the realm of 
freedom (McDowell 1994, 5). Norms do not cluster into independent 
spaces but they hang together holistically by virtue of their logical 
connections. 
Méditations Hégéliennes 
In his seminal work, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Sellars 
calls his philosophical project a Méditations hégéliennes (Sellars 1997, 
83), and his successors also manifest a deep interest in the philosophy of 
Hegel. Hegel is interesting to the Pittsburgh school partly because of their 
commitment to psychological nominalism—the view that all awareness 
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is a linguistic affair (Sellars 1997, 63). Assigning original intentionality 
to language conforms to Hegel’s view that reason is embodied concretely 
in human life. Another less explored reason for the attractiveness of 
Hegel is his account of how an initiation into language, a potential 
rationality, is fully realized in human freedom. Freedom for Hegel is 
action in accordance with reason; he writes that “man is an object of 
existence in himself only in virtue of the Divine that is in him, that which 
was designated at the outset as Reason, which, in view of its activity and 
power of self-determination, was called Freedom” (Hegel 2001, 48). To 
act rationally is to act from norms or prescriptions that have a purely 
rational grounding, or to put it in Sellarsian terms, it is to be responsive 
to the norms of the space of the reasons. Only when one acts from the 
laws of reason, then one is raised from the determined state of being an 
animal and enters on the path of freedom: “Only that will which obeys 
law is free … When the subjective will of man submits to laws – the 
contradiction between Liberty and Necessity vanishes” (Hegel 2001, 54). 
For Hegel, achieving the status of a fully rational agent is mediated by 
submission to the laws of the state. Hegel writes: “In the history of the 
world, only those people can come under our notice which form a State. 
For it must be understood that this latter is the realization of Freedom, i.e. 
of the absolute final aim, and that it exists for its own sake … all the worth 
a human being possesses – all spiritual reality, he possesses only through 
the State” (Hegel 2001, 54). By being loyal citizens of the State, human 
beings become spiritual beings, participating in the highest freedom. 
Furthermore, for Hegel, religion is integral to the foundation of the state: 
“the position thus assigned to Religion supposes the State already to exist; 
and that subsequently, in order to maintain it, Religion must be brought 
into it – in buckets and bushels, as it were – and impressed upon people’s 
hearts” (Hegel 2001, 67). For Hegel, the practice of religion serves the 
state because it fortifies the citizen’s resolve in being dutiful and that 
ultimately facilitates freedom, the ability to abide by rational laws.  
Alfarabi on Initiation into the Space of Reasons 
As we have seen, to occupy an autonomous standing in the space of 
reasons requires responsiveness to norms or prescriptions that are 
categorical—that is, empirically unconditioned. This, for Alfarabi, is 
cultivated by a religious training, because religion’s unshakeable laws 
“imitate” the categorical norms of reason:  
Now when one acquires knowledge of the beings or receives instruction in 
them, if he perceives their ideas themselves with his intellect, and his assent 
to them is by means of certain demonstrations, then the science that 
comprises these cognitions is philosophy. But if they are known by 
imagining them through similitudes that imitate them, and assent to what 
is imagined of them is caused by persuasive methods, then the ancients call 
what comprises these cognitions religion. (Alfarabi 2011, 68) 
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Religion, then, provides the novice with an appropriate orientation 
in the space of reasons by persuasion and the use of imagination. As the 
initiation proceeds, the knower gets closer to the real: 
Now these things (God, world, human beings, and politics) can be known 
in two ways, either by being impressed on their souls as they really are 
or by being impressed on them through affinity and symbolic 
representation. In that case, symbols arise in man’s minds, which 
reproduce them by imitation. The philosophers in the city are those who 
know these things through strict demonstration and their own insight; 
those who are close to the philosophers know them as they really are 
through the insight of the philosophers, following them, assenting to their 
views and trusting them. But others know them through symbols which 
reproduce them by imitation, because neither nature nor habit has 
provided their minds with the gift to understand them as they are. Both 
are kinds of knowledge. (Alfarabi 1985, 280) 
The grasp of religious knowledge prepares the knower for the 
actualization of her intellect, so that she is not merely responding to the 
unarticulated content, given in unrefined experience, for the sake of 
animalistic concerns. Religion helps the knower to look away from such 
concerns. 
Alfarabi also relates religious norms to the apparatus of the state. 
For him, the ideal philosophical sovereign is also a religious lawgiver:  
When this [perfection] occurs in both parts of his rational faculty, namely 
the theoretical and the practical rational faculties, and also in his 
representative faculty, then it is this man who receives Divine Revelation, 
and God almighty grants him Revelation through the mediation of the 
Active Intellect … Thus he is … a wise man and a philosopher and an 
accomplished thinker who employs an intellect of divine quality, and 
through the emanation from the Active Intellect to his faculty of 
representation a visionary prophet: who warns of things to come and tells 
of particular things which exist at present. This man holds the most perfect 
rank of humanity and has reached the highest degree of felicity … This is 
the sovereign over whom no other human being has any sovereignty 
whatsoever. (Alfarabi 1985, 245-46) 
For Alfarabi, philosophy precedes religion in time (Alfarabi 2011, 
45), and the initiation into the philosophical mastery of the space of 
reasons is reflected in the political and religious norms (instituted 
ideally by a philosopher-prophet-king), such that everyone within the 
community is given a chance to acquire such mastery. 
Conclusion 
Reflection on Hegel and Alfarabi in the context of the approach to 
intentionality advocated by the Sellarsian Pittsburgh school, allows us 
to appreciate the depths of the latter in its ability to retrieve the insights 
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of the past masters. In this short paper, I have examined briefly some of 
the political and religious dimension of these insights. I presented two 
conflicting accounts. Hegel, as we saw, maintains that human capacity 
for reason is a divine spark within him and is actualized by means of 
his participation in a state, anchored by religious law. For Hegel, the 
evolution of the state achieves a culmination in the Roman 
appropriation of Christianity, and the latter bears its fruit in the modern 
European political culture. Alfarabi, in agreement with the Hegelian 
view, maintains that the state and its appropriation of religion are 
necessary conditions for the realization of the human capacity for 
reason and the attainment of the philosophical life. However, he is more 
inclusive in that he—in keeping with Islamic principles of a prophetic 
state—gives an outline of an ideal state instituted by a charismatic 
philosophical ruler, yet remains just aloof enough to accommodate 
other possible actualizations of the ideal. This pluralism is what I find 
more appealing than Hegel’s Eurocentric vision. 
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